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Abstract:   
We extend the Consumption-based CAPM (C-CAPM) model to representative agents 
with different risk attitudes. We first use the concept of expectation dependence and 
show that for a risk averse representative agent, it is the first-degree expectation 
dependence (FED) rather than the covariance that determines C-CAPM’s riskiness. We 
extend the assumption of risk aversion to prudence and propose the measure of 
second-degree expectation dependence (SED) to obtain the values of asset price and 
equity premium. These theoretical results are linked to the equity premium puzzle. Using 
the same dataset as in Campbell (2003), the estimated measures of relative risk 
aversion from FED and SED approximations are much lower than those obtained in the 
original study and correspond to the theoretical values often discussed in the literature. 
The theoretical model is then generalized to higher-degree risk changes and higher-
order risk averse representative agents. 
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1 Introduction
The consumption-based capital asset pricing model (C-CAPM), developed in Rubinstein (1976),
Lucas (1978), Breeden (1979) and Grossman and Shiller (1981), relates the risk premium on
each asset to the covariance between the asset’s return and a decision maker’s intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution. The most important comparative static results for C-CAPM is
how an asset’s price or equity premium changes as the quantity and price of risk change. The
results of comparative statics analysis thus form the basis for much of our understanding of the
sources of changes in consumption (macroeconomic) risk and risk aversion that drive asset prices
and equity premia.
The three objectives of this study are to propose a new theoretical framework for C-CAPM,
to extend its comparative statics, and to verify empirically how our framework can be useful to
solve the equity premium puzzle. We use general utility functions and probability distributions
to investigate C-CAPM. Our model provides insight into the basic concepts that determine asset
prices and equity premia and generate reasonable empirical measures of relative risk aversion.
The C-CAPM pricing rule is sometimes interpreted as implying that the price of an as-
set with a random payoff falls short of its expected payoff if and only if the random payoff
positively correlates with consumption. Liu and Wang (2007) show that this interpretation of
C-CAPM is generally inadequate by presenting a counterexample. We use more powerful sta-
tistical tools to obtain the appropriate dependence between asset payoff and consumption. We
first discuss the concept of expectation dependence developed by Wright (1987) and Li (2011).
We show that, with general distributions and utility functions, for a risk averse representa-
tive agent, it is the first-degree expectation dependence (FED) between the asset’s payoff and
consumption rather than the covariance that determines C-CAPM’s riskiness. Our result also
reinterprets the covariance between an asset’s payoff and the marginal utility of consumption
in terms of the expectation dependence between the asset’s payoff and consumption itself. We
extend the assumption of risk aversion to prudence and propose the measure of second-degree
expectation dependence (SED) to obtain the values of asset price and equity premium. We
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interpret C-CAPM in a general setting: for the ith-degree risk averse representative agent,1 with
i = 2, .., N+1, it is the N th-order expectation dependence that determines C-CAPM’s riskiness.
We also provide bivariate log-normal and truncated standardized bivariate normal distribution
examples to measure first-degree expectation dependence and second-degree expectation depen-
dence empirically, and to construct shifts in distributions that satisfy the comparative statics.
Examples of nonelliptical distributions are also provided. Our empirical results are linked to
the equity premium puzzle. Using the same dataset as in Campbell (2003), the estimated mea-
sures of relative risk aversion, using FED and SED approximations, are much lower than those
obtained in the original study.
Our contribution is also linked to the recent literature on higher-order risk preferences and
higher-order moments and comoments in finance developed by Harvey and Siddique (2000),
Dittmar (2002), Mitton and Vorkink (2007), Chabi-Yo et al. (2007), and Martellini and Zier-
mann (2010). We provide a theoretical foundation for the pricing kernel model based on higher
comoments than the covariance by suggesting a more general definition of dependence between
consumption and asset payoff, and propose a general pricing formula not restricted to specific
utility functions.
Our study also relates to Gollier and Schlesinger (2002), who examine asset prices in a
representative-agent model of general equilibrium, with two differences. First, we study asset
price and equity premium driven by macroeconomic risk as in the traditional C-CAPM model,
while Gollier and Schlesinger’s model considers the relationship between the riskiness of the
market portfolio and its expected return. Second, Gollier and Schlesinger’s model is a one-
period model whereas our results rest on a two-period framework.
Finally, our study extends the literature that examines the effects of higher-degree risk
changes on the economy. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) investigate necessary and sufficient
conditions on preferences for a higher-degree change in risk to increase saving. Our study
provides necessary and sufficient conditions on preferences for a higher-degree change in risk to
set asset prices, and sufficient conditions on preferences for a higher-degree change in risk to set
equity premia.
1Risk aversion in the traditional sense of a concave utility function is indicated by i = 2, whereas i = 3
corresponds to downside risk aversion in the sense of Menezes, Geiss and Tressler (1980). ith-degree risk aversion
is equivalent to preferences satisfying risk apportionment of order i. See Ekern (1980) and Eeckhoudt and
Schlesinger (2006) for more discussions.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces several concepts of dependence. Section
3 provides a reinterpretation of C-CAPM for risk averse representative agents. Section 4 extends
the results of Section 3 to prudent and higher-order risk averse agents respectively. Section 5
discusses the results in relation to local indexes of risk aversion and higher-order moments and
comoments. Section 6 shows empirically how our model can help to mitigate the equity premium
puzzle. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Concepts of dependence
The concept of correlation coined by Galton (1886) had served as the only measure of dependence
for the first 70 years of the 20th century. However correlation is too weak to obtain meaningful
conclusions in many economic and financial applications. For example, covariance is a poor tool
for describing dependence for non-normal distributions. Since Lehmann’s introduction of the
concept of quadrant dependence in 1966, stronger definitions of dependence have received much
attention in the statistical literature2.
Suppose x˜ × y˜ ∈ R × R are two continuous random variables. Let F (x, y) denote the joint
and Fx(x) and Fy(y) the marginal distributions of x˜ and y˜. Lehmann (1966) introduces the
following concept to investigate positive dependence.
Definition 2.1 (Lehmann, 1966) (x˜, y˜) is positively quadrant dependent, written as PQD(x˜, y˜),
if
F (x, y) ≥ Fx(x)Fy(y) for all (x, y) ∈ R×R. (1)
The above inequality can be rewritten as
Fx(x|y˜ ≤ y) ≥ Fx(x) (2)
and Lehmann provides the following interpretation of definition (2.1): “knowledge of y˜ being
small increases the probability of x˜ being small.” PQD is useful to model dependent risks because
it can take into account the simultaneous downside (upside) evolution of risks. The marginal and
the conditional CDFs can be changed simultaneously.3 We notice that there are many bivariate
2For surveys of the literature, we refer to Joe (1997), Mari and Kotz (2001) and Embrechts (2009).
3Portfolio selection problems with positive quadrant dependency have been explored by Pellerey and Semeraro
(2005) and Dachraoui and Dionne (2007), among others. Pellerey and Semeraro (2005) assert that a large subset
of the elliptical distributions class is PQD.
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random variables other than elliptical or Gaussian distributions being PQD. For examples of
such distributions, see Joe (1997) or Balakrishnan and Lai (2009).
Wright (1987) introduced the concept of expectation dependence in the economics literature.
The following definition uses a weaker definition of dependence than PQD.
Definition 2.2 If
FED(x˜|y) = [Ex˜− E(x˜|y˜ ≤ y)] ≥ 0 for all y ∈ R, (3)
then x˜ is positive first− degree expectation dependent on y˜.
The family of all distributions F satisfying (3) will be denoted by F1. Similarly, x˜ is negative
first-degree expectation dependent on y˜ if (3) holds with the inequality sign reversed. The
totality of negative first-degree expectation dependent distributions will be denoted by G1.
Wright (1987, page 113) interprets negative first-degree expectation dependence as follows:
“when we discover y˜ is small, in the precise sense that we are given the truncation y˜ ≤ y, our
expectation of x˜ is revised upward.” First-degree expectation dependence is a stronger definition
of dependence than correlation, but a weaker definition than quadrant dependence. Therefore,
bivariate random variables being positive (negative) quadrant dependent are also first-degree
expectation dependent. However, as the next example shows, positive (negative) correlated
random variables are not necessary positive (negative) first-degree expectation dependent.
Example 2.3 Let x˜ be normally distributed with Ex˜ = µ > 0 and var(x˜) = σ2. Let y˜ = x˜2.
Since Ex˜2 = µ2 + σ2 and Ex˜3 = µ3 + 3µσ2, then
cov(x˜, y˜) = Ex˜y˜ − Ex˜Ey˜ (4)
= Ex˜3 − Ex˜Ex˜2
= µ3 + 3µσ2 − µ(µ2 + σ2) = 2µσ2 > 0.
By definition,
FED(y˜| −
√
µ2 + σ2) = Ex˜2 − E(x˜2|x˜ ≤ −
√
µ2 + σ2) (5)
= µ2 + σ2 − E(x˜2|x˜ ≤ −
√
µ2 + σ2) < 0,
and we obtain (y˜, x˜) /∈ F1.
First-degree expectation dependence can be applied to log-normal random variables.
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Example 2.4 Consider bivariate log-normal random variables (x˜, y˜) with joint probability dis-
tribution F (x, y) such that
 log(x˜)
log(y˜)
 ∼ N

 µ1
µ2
 ,

σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2


(6)
where indexes 1 and 2 are used for log(x˜) and log(y˜) respectively. We know that (see Lien 1985,
p244-245)
E(x˜|y˜ ≤ y) = exp(µ1 + σ
2
1
2
)
Φ( log(y)−µ2−σ12σ2 )
Φ( log(y)−µ2σ2 )
, (7)
where Φ(x) is the cumulative density function of a standardized normal random variable evalu-
ated at x,
cov(x˜, y˜) = Ex˜y˜ − Ex˜Ey˜ = exp(µ1 + µ2 + σ
2
1 + σ
2
2
2
)[exp(σ12)− 1] (8)
and
FED(x˜|y) = Ex˜− E(x˜|y˜ ≤ y) = exp(µ1 + σ
2
1
2
)(1− Φ(
log(y)−µ2−σ12
σ2
)
Φ( log(y)−µ2σ2 )
), (9)
So σ12 ≥ 0⇔ cov(x˜, y˜) ≥ 0⇔ FED(x˜|y) ≥ 0.
We can also relate FED(x˜|y) to the correlation coefficient ρ .
Example 2.5 Consider a truncated standardized bivariate normal distribution with h < x˜ <∞,
−∞ < y˜ < ∞ and correlation coefficient ρ. From Balakrishnan and Lai (2009, p532-533), we
know that the marginal density of y˜ is Φ(y)Ψ(−h)Ψ(
−h+ρy√
1−ρ2 ), where Ψ the cumulative distribution
function of the standardized univariate normal distribution. Let ET denote the mean after
truncation. Then (see Balakrishnan and Lai 2009, p532-533)
ET (x˜) =
Φ(h)
Ψ(−h) (10)
and
ET (x˜|y˜ = y) = ρy +
√
1− ρ2
Φ( h−ρy√
1−ρ2 )
Ψ(−h+ρy√
1−ρ2 )
. (11)
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Hence
ET (x˜|y˜ ≤ y) (12)
=
∫ y
−∞
ET (x˜|y˜ = t)dFy(t)
= ρ
∫ y
−∞
t
Φ(t)
Ψ(−h)Ψ(
−h+ ρt√
1− ρ2 )dt+
√
1− ρ2
∫ y
−∞
Φ( h−ρt√
1−ρ2 )
Ψ( −h+ρt√
1−ρ2 )
Φ(t)
Ψ(−h)Ψ(
−h+ ρt√
1− ρ2 )dt
=
ρ
Ψ(−h)
∫ y
−∞
tΦ(t)Ψ(
−h+ ρt√
1− ρ2 )dt+
√
1− ρ2
Ψ(−h)
∫ y
−∞
Φ(t)Φ(
h− ρt√
1− ρ2 )dt
and
FED(x˜|y) = ET (x˜)− ET (x˜|y˜ ≤ y) (13)
=
1
Ψ(−h) [Φ(h)− ρ
∫ y
−∞
tΦ(t)Ψ(
−h+ ρt√
1− ρ2 )dt−
√
1− ρ2
∫ y
−∞
Φ(t)Φ(
h− ρt√
1− ρ2 )dt].
Therefore, we can see that ρ > 0 cannot guarantee FED(x˜|y) > 0.
Li (2011) proposes the following weaker definition of dependence:
Definition 2.6 If
SED(x˜|y) =
∫ y
−∞
[Ex˜− E(x˜|y˜ ≤ t)]Fy(t)dt (14)
=
∫ y
−∞
FED(x˜|t)Fy(t)dt ≥ 0 for all y,
then x˜ is positive second-degree expectation dependent on y˜.
The family of all distributions F satisfying (14) will be denoted by F2. Similarly, x˜ is negative
second-degree expectation dependent on y˜ if (14) holds with the inequality sign reversed, and
the totality of negative second-degree expectation dependent distributions will be denoted by
G2.
It is obvious that F1 ⊆ F2 and G1 ⊆ G2 but the converse is not true. Because x˜ and y˜ are
positively correlated when (see Lehmann 1966, lemma 2)
cov(x˜, y˜) =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
[F (x, y)− Fx(x)Fy(y)]dxdy =
∫ +∞
−∞
FED(x˜|t)Fy(t)dt ≥ 0, (15)
again we see that cov(x˜, y˜) ≥ 0 is only a necessary condition for (x˜, y˜) ∈ F2 but the converse is
not true. Therefore, we notice there are many bivariate random variables other than elliptical
or Gaussian distributions being FED or SED, because all the PQD distributions are also FED
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and SED. Comparing (14) and (15), we know that cov(x˜, y˜) is the 2nd central cross moment of
x˜ and y˜, while SED(x˜|y) is related to the 2nd central cross lower partial moment of x˜ and y˜
which can be explained as a measure of downside risk computed as the average of the squared
deviations below a target.
The following two examles relate SED(x˜|y) to the covariance and the correlation coefficient.
Example 2.7 For bivariate log-normal random variables (x˜, y˜) defined in (6),
SED(x˜|y) =
∫ y
−∞
exp(µ1 +
σ21
2
)[1− Φ(
log(t)−µ2−σ12
σ2
)
Φ( log(t)−µ2σ2 )
]Φ(
log(t)− µ2
σ2
)dt (16)
= exp(µ1 +
σ21
2
)
∫ y
−∞
[Φ(
log(t)− µ2
σ2
)− Φ(log(t)− µ2 − σ12
σ2
)]dt,
So σ12 ≥ 0⇔ cov(x˜, y˜) ≥ 0⇔ SED(x˜|y) ≥ 0.
Example 2.8 Considering the truncated standardized bivariate normal distribution defined in
Example 2.5, we can verify that ρ > 0 does not guarantee SED(x˜|y) > 0.
For our purpose of extending the C-CAPM model, comparative expectation dependence
has to be defined. We propose the following definition to quantify comparative expectation
dependence.
Definition 2.9 Distribution F (x, y) is more first-degree expectation dependent than H(x, y) if
and only if FEDF (x˜|y)Fy(y) ≥ FEDH(x˜|y)Hy(y) for all y. Distribution F (x, y) is more second
order expectation dependent than H(x, y), if FEDF (x˜) ≥ FEDH(x˜), and
SEDF (x˜|y) ≥ SEDH(x˜|y) for all y. (17)
Example 2.10 Consider bivariate log-normal random variables (x˜, y˜) with probability distribu-
tion F (x, y) such that
 log(x˜)
log(y˜)
 ∼ N

 µ1
µ2
 ,

σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2


(18)
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and random variables (x˜′, y˜′) and with probability distribution H(x′, y′) such that
 log(x˜′)
log(y˜′)
 ∼ N

 µ′1
µ′2
 ,

σ′1
2 σ′12
σ′12 σ′2
2


. (19)
Then
FEDF (x˜|y)Fy(y) ≥ FEDH(x˜|y)Hy(y) (20)
⇔ exp(µ1 + σ
2
1
2
)[Φ(
log(y)− µ2
σ2
)− Φ(log(y)− µ2 − σ12
σ2
)]
≥ exp(µ′1 +
σ′1
2
2
)[Φ(
log(y)− µ′2
σ′2
)− Φ(log(y)− µ
′
2 − σ′12
σ′2
)]
and
SEDF (x˜|y) ≥ SEDH(x˜|y) (21)
⇔ exp(µ1 + σ
2
1
2
)
∫ y
−∞
[Φ(
log(t)− µ2
σ2
)− Φ(log(t)− µ2 − σ12
σ2
)]dt
≥ exp(µ′1 +
σ′1
2
2
)
∫ y
−∞
[Φ(
log(t)− µ′2
σ′2
)− Φ(log(t)− µ
′
2 − σ′12
σ′2
)]dt.
3 C-CAPM for a risk averse representative agent
3.1 Consumption-based asset pricing model
Suppose that an investor can freely buy or sell an asset with random payoff x˜t+1 at a price
pt. The investor’s preference can be represented by a utility function u(.). We assume that all
derivatives for u(.) exist. Denote ξ as the amount of the asset the investor chooses to buy. Then,
his decision problem is to
max
ξ
u(ct) + βEt[u(c˜t+1)] (22)
s.t. ct = et − ptξ
c˜t+1 = et+1 + x˜t+1ξ,
where et and et+1 are the original consumption levels, β is the subjective discount factor, ct is
the consumption in period t, and c˜t+1 is the consumption in period t+ 1.
From the first order condition of this problem, we can obtain the well-known consumption-
based asset pricing model which can be expressed by the following two equations (see e.g.
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Cochrane 2005, page 13-14).4
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf
+ β
covt[u
′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1]
u′(ct)
, (23)
and
EtR˜t+1 −Rf = −covt[u
′(c˜t+1), R˜t+1]
Etu′(c˜t+1)
(24)
where 1 + R˜t+1 =
x˜t+1
Pt
is defined as the asset’s gross return in period t+ 1, 1 +Rf is defined as
the gross return of the risk-free asset, u′(·) is the marginal utility function, ER˜t+1 − Rf is the
asset’s risk premium.
The first term on the right-hand side of (23) is the standard risk-free present value formula.
This is the asset’s price for a risk-neutral representative agent or for a representative agent when
asset payoff and consumption are independent. The second term is a risk aversion adjustment.
(23) states that an asset with random future payoff x˜t+1 is worth less than its expected payoff
discounted at the risk-free rate if and only if cov[u′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1] ≤ 0. (24) shows that an asset
has an expected return equal to the risk-free rate plus a risk adjustment under risk aversion.
When the representative agent’s utility function is the power function, u(ct) =
c1−γt −1
1−γ where
γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and c˜t+1 and x˜t+1 are conditional lognormally dis-
tributed, (24) becomes (Campbell 2003, page 819)
Etr˜t+1 − rf + vart(r˜t+1)
2
= γcovt(log c˜t+1, r˜t+1), (25)
where r˜t+1 = log(1 + R˜t+1) and r
f = log(1 +Rf ).
(25) states that the log risk premium is equal to the product of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion and the covariance of the log asset return with consumption growth. We now provide
a generalization of these results.
From Theorem 1 in Cuadras (2002), we know that covariance can always be written as
covt[u
′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1] =
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ +∞
−∞
[F (ct+1, xt+1)− Fct+1(ct+1)Fxt+1(xt+1)]u′′(ct+1)dxt+1dct+1.(26)
Because we can write∫ +∞
−∞
[Fxt+1(xt+1|c˜t+1 ≤ ct+1)− Fxt+1(xt+1)]dxt+1 = Ex˜t+1 − E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ ct+1),
4Equations (23) and (24) can also be obtained in a muti-period dynamic framework from Euler equations. For
more details, see Constantinides and Duffie (1996).
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(see, e.g., Tesfatsion (1976), Lemma 1), hence, we have
covt[u
′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1] (27)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
[Ex˜t+1 − E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ ct+1)]Fct+1(ct+1)u′′(ct+1)dct+1
=
∫ +∞
−∞
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)u′′(ct+1)Fct+1(ct+1)dct+1.
(27) allows us to break the covariance out in terms of the FED and agents’ preferences5.
Using (27), (23) can be rewritten as
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk−free present value effect
−β
∫ +∞
−∞
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)Fct+1(ct+1)[−
u′′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
]dct+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
first−degree expectation dependence effect
(28)
=
Etx˜t+1
Rf
− β
∫ +∞
−∞
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)Fct+1(ct+1)AR(ct+1)MRSct+1,ctdct+1,
where AR(x) = −u′′(x)u′(x) is the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient, and MRSx,y = u
′(x)
u′(y)
is the marginal rate of substitution between x and y.6
We can also rewrite (24) as
EtR˜t+1 −Rf =
∫ +∞
−∞
FED(R˜t+1|ct+1)Fct+1(ct+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption risk effect
[− u
′′(ct+1)
Etu′(c˜t+1)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
price of risk effect
dct+1 (29)
Because Rf = 1β
u′(ct)
Etu′(c˜t+1) (see e.g. Cochrane 2005, page 11), we also have
EtR˜t+1 −Rf = βRf
∫ +∞
−∞
FED(R˜t+1|ct+1)Fct+1(ct+1)AR(ct+1)MRSct+1,ctdct+1 (30)
(28) shows that an asset’s price involves two terms. The effect, measured by the first term
on the right-hand side of (28), is the “risk-free present value effect.” This effect depends on
the expected return of the asset and the risk-free interest rate. The sign of the risk-free present
value effect is the same as the sign of the expected return. This term captures the “direct” effect
of the risk-free present expected return, which characterizes the asset’s price for a risk-neutral
representative agent.
The second term on the right-hand side of (28) is called “first-degree expectation depen-
dence effect.” This term involves the subjective discount factor, the expectation dependence
5When (c˜t+1, x˜t+1) is joint normal distribution, Stein’s lemma can be applied to compute covt[u
′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1] =
covt(c˜t+1, x˜t+1)Et(U
′′(c˜t+1)) (see e.g. Cochrane 2005, page 163).
6Andersen et al. (2011) propose a multi-attribute risk aversion model that allows one to separate the intertem-
poral risk aversion coefficient into the risk aversion coefficient and the MRS
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between the random payoff and consumption, the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient and the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. The sign of the first-degree expectation depen-
dence indicates whether the movements on consumption tend to reinforce (positive first-degree
expectation dependence) or to counteract (negative first-degree expectation dependence) the
movements on an asset’s payoff.
(29) states that the expected excess return on any risky asset over the risk-free interest rate
can be explained as the sum of the quantity of consumption risk times the price of this risk.
The quantity of consumption risk is measured by the first-degree expectation dependence of the
excess stock return with consumption, while the price of risk is the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion
coefficient times the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
We obtain the following proposition from (28) and (29).
Proposition 3.1 Suppose F (xt+1, ct+1) and F (Rt+1, ct+1) are continuous, then the following
statements hold:
(i) pt ≤ Etx˜t+1Rf for any risk averse representative agent (u′′ ≤ 0) if and only if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈
F1;
(ii) pt ≥ Etx˜t+1Rf for any risk averse representative agent (u′′ ≤ 0) if and only if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈
G1;
(iii) EtR˜t+1 ≥ Rf for any risk averse representative agent (u′′ ≤ 0) if and only if (R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈
F1;
(iv) EtR˜t+1 ≤ Rf for any risk averse representative agent (u′′ ≤ 0) if and only if (R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈
G1.
Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.1 states that, for a risk averse representative agent, an asset’s price is low-
ered (or equity premium is positive) if and only if its payoff is positively first-degree expec-
tation dependent with consumption. Conversely, an asset’s price is raised (or equity pre-
mium is negative) if and only if its payoff is negatively first-degree expectation dependent
with consumption. Therefore, for a risk averse representative agent, it is the first-degree
expectation dependence rather than the covariance that determines its riskiness. Because
(x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ F1(G1) ⇒ covt(x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ≥ 0(≤ 0) and the converse is not true, we conclude
that a positive (negative) covariance is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a risk averse
agent paying a lower (higher) asset price (or having a positive (negative) equity premium).
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Example 3.2 For bivariate log-normal (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) = (x˜, y˜) defined in (6), σ12 ≥ 0, if and only
if pt ≤ Etx˜t+1Rf for any risk averse representative agent.
3.2 Comparative risk aversion
The assumption of risk aversion has long been a cornerstone of modern economics and finance.
Ross (1981) provides the following strong measure for comparative risk reversion:
Definition 3.3 (Ross 1981) u is more Ross risk averse than v if and only if there exists λ > 0
such that for all x, y
u′′(x)
v′′(x)
≥ λ ≥ u
′(y)
v′(y)
. (31)
More risk averse in the sense of Ross guarantees that the more risk averse decision-maker is
willing to pay more to benefit from a mean preserving contraction.
Our important comparative statics question is: Under which condition does a change in the
representative agent’s risk preferences reduce the asset price? To answer this question let us
consider a change in the utility function from u to v. From (28), for agent v, we have
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf
− β
∫ +∞
−∞
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)[−
v′′(ct+1)
v′(ct)
]dct+1. (32)
Intuition suggests that if asset return and consumption are positive dependent and agent v
is more risk averse than agent u, then agent v should have a larger risk premium than agent u.
This intuition can be reinforced by Ross risk aversion and first-degree expectation dependence,
as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4 Let put and p
v
t denote the asset’s prices corresponding to u and v respectively.
Suppose u′, v′, u′′ and v′′ are continuous, then the following statements hold:
(i) put ≥ pvt for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ F1 if and only if v is more Ross risk averse than u;
(ii) put ≥ pvt for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ G1 if and only if u is more Ross risk averse than v;
Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.4 indicates that when an asset’s payoff is first-degree positive (negative) ex-
pectation dependent on consumption, an increase in risk aversion in the sense of Ross decreases
(increases) the asset price.
Example 3.5 For bivariate log-normal (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) = (x˜, y˜) defined in (6), if σ12 ≥ 0, then the
order of risk aversion in the sense of Ross is equivalent to the order of asset price.
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3.3 Changes in joint distributions
The question dual to the change in risk aversion examined above is: Under which condition does
a change in the joint distribution of random payoff and consumption increase the asset’s price?
We may also ask the same question for the risk premium by using the joint distribution of an
asset’s gross return and consumption. To address these questions, let us denote EHt and FEDH
as the expectation and first-order expectation dependency under distribution H(x, y). Let pFt
and pHt denote the corresponding prices under distributions F (x, y) and H(x, y) respectively.
From (28), we have
pHt =
EHt x˜t+1
Rf
− β
∫ +∞
−∞
FEDH(x˜t+1|ct+1)HCt+1(ct+1)[−
u′′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
]dct+1. (33)
From (28) and (33), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.6 (i) Suppose F (xt+1, ct+1) is continuous and E
F
t x˜t+1 = E
H
t x˜t+1, then p
F
t ≤
pHt for all risk averse representative agents if and only if F (xt+1, ct+1) is more first-degree
expectation dependent than H(xt+1, ct+1);
(ii)Suppose F (Rt+1, ct+1) is continuous, then for all risk averse representative agents, F (Rt+1, ct+1)
is more first-degree expectation dependent than H(Rt+1, ct+1) if and only if the risk premium
under F (Rt+1, ct+1) is greater than under H(Rt+1, ct+1).
Proof See Appendix A.
Proposition 3.6 shows that a pure increase in first-degree expectation dependence repre-
sents an increase in asset riskiness for all risk averse investors. The next corollary considers a
simultaneous variation in expected return and dependence.
Corollary 3.7 For all risk averse representative agents, EFt x˜t+1 ≤ EHt x˜t+1 and F (xt+1, ct+1)
is more first-degree expectation dependent than H(xt+1, ct+1) imply p
F
t ≤ pHt .
Proof The sufficient conditions are directly obtained from (28) and (33).
Corollary 3.7 states that, for all risk averse representative agents, a decrease in the expected
return and an increase in the first-degree expectation dependence between return and consump-
tion will decrease the asset’s price. Again, the key available concept for prediction is comparative
first-degree expectation dependence.
Example 3.8 For bivariate log-normal (R˜t+1, c˜t+1) = (x˜, y˜) and (R˜
′
t+1, c˜
′
t+1) = (x˜
′, y˜′) defined
in (18) and (19), if (20) holds, then, for all risk averse representative agents, pFt ≤ pHt .
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4 C-CAPM for a higher-order risk averse representative agent
4.1 C-CAPM for a risk averse and prudent representative agent
The concept of prudence and its relationship to precautionary savings was introduced by Kimball
(1990). Since then, prudence has become a common and accepted assumption in the economics
literature (Gollier 2001). All prudent agents dislike any increase in downside risk in the sense of
Menezes et al. (1980) (see also Chiu, 2005.). Deck and Schlesinger (2010) conduct a laboratory
experiment to determine whether preferences are prudent, and show behavioral evidence for
prudence. In this section, we will demonstrate that we can get dependence conditions for
asset price and equity premium in addition to first-degree expectation dependence, when the
representative agent is risk averse and prudent.
We can integrate the right-hand term of (27) by parts and obtain:
covt[u
′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1] =
∫ +∞
−∞
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)u′′(ct+1)Fct+1(ct+1)dct+1 (34)
=
∫ +∞
−∞
u′′(ct+1)d(
∫ ct+1
−∞
[Ex˜t+1 − E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ s)]Fct+1(s)ds)
= u′′(ct+1)
∫ ct+1
−∞
[Ex˜t+1 − E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ s)]Fct+1(s)ds|+∞−∞
−
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ ct+1
−∞
[Ex˜t+1 − E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ s)]Fct+1(s)dsu′′′(ct+1)dct+1
= u′′(+∞)
∫ +∞
−∞
[Ex˜t+1 − E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ s)]Fct+1(s)ds
−
∫ +∞
−∞
∫ ct+1
−∞
[Ex˜t+1 − E(x˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ s)]Fct+1(s)dsu′′′(ct+1)dct+1
= u′′(+∞)covt(x˜t+1, c˜t+1)−
∫ +∞
−∞
SED(x˜t+1|ct+1)u′′′(ct+1)dct+1.
From equation (15), we know that a positive SED implies a positive cov(x˜t+1, c˜t+1) but the
converse is not true. Hence, we have from (34) that covt(x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ≥ 0 is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for covt[u
′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1] ≤ 0 for all u′′ ≤ 0 and u′′′ ≥ 0. With a positive SED
function, prudence is also necessary.
(23) and (24) can be rewritten as:
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk−free present value effect
−βcovt(x˜t+1, c˜t+1)[−u
′′(+∞)
u′(ct)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
covariance effect
(35)
−β
∫ +∞
−∞
SED(x˜t+1|ct+1)[u
′′′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
]dct+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
second−degree expectation dependence effect
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or
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf
− βcovt(x˜t+1, c˜t+1)AR(+∞)MRS+∞,ct (36)
−β
∫ +∞
−∞
SED(x˜t+1|ct+1)AP (ct+1)MRSct+1,ctdct+1,
where AP (x) = u
′′′(x)
u′(x) is the index of absolute prudence
7, and
EtR˜t+1 −Rf (37)
= covt(R˜t+1, c˜t+1)[− u
′′(+∞)
Etu′(c˜t+1)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption covariance effect
+
∫ +∞
−∞
SED(R˜t+1|ct+1) u
′′′(ct+1)
Etu′(c˜t+1)
dct+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption second−degree expectation dependence effect
or
EtR˜t+1 −Rf (38)
= βRfcovt(R˜t+1, c˜t+1)AR(+∞)MRS+∞,ct
+βRf
∫ +∞
−∞
SED(R˜t+1|ct+1)AP (ct+1)MRSct+1,ctdct+1.
Condition (35) includes three terms. The first one is the same as in condition (28). The second
term on the right-hand side of (35) is called the “covariance effect.” This term involves β, the
covariance of asset return and consumption, the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coefficient and the
marginal rates of substitution. The third term on the right-hand side of (35) is called “second-
degree expectation dependence effect,” which reflects the way in which second-degree expectation
dependence of risk affects asset’s price through the intensity of downside risk aversion. Again
(35) affirms that positive correlation is only a necessary condition for all risk averse and prudent
agents to pay a lower price. Equation (37) shows that a positive SED reinforces the positive
covariance effect to obtain a positive risk premium.
We state the following propositions without proof. The proofs of these propositions are
similar to the proofs of Propositions in Section 3, and are therefore skipped. They are available
from the authors.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose F (xt+1, ct+1) and F (Rt+1, ct+1) are continuous, then the following
statements hold:
(i) pt ≤ Etx˜t+1Rf for any risk averse and prudent representative agent (u′′ ≤ 0 and u′′′ ≥ 0) if
and only if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ F2;
7Modica and Scarsini (2005), Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008) and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010) propose u
′′′(x)
u′(x)
instead of −u′′′(x)
u′′(x) (Kimball, 1990) as an alternative candidate to evaluate the intensity of prudence.
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(ii) pt ≥ Etx˜t+1Rf for any risk averse and prudent representative agent (u′′ ≤ 0 and u′′′ ≥ 0) if
and only if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ G2;
(iii) EtR˜t+1 ≥ Rf for any risk averse and prudent representative agents (u′′ ≤ 0 and u′′′ ≥ 0)
if and only if (R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ F2;
(iv) EtR˜t+1 ≤ Rf for any risk averse and prudent representative agents (u′′ ≤ 0 and u′′′ ≥ 0)
if and only if (R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ G2.
Modica and Scarsini (2005) provide a comparative statics criterion for downside risk in the
spirit of Ross (1981).
Definition 4.2 (Modica and Scarsini 2005) u is more downside risk averse than v if and only
if there exists λ > 0 such that for all x, y
u′′′(x)
v′′′(x)
≥ λ ≥ u
′(y)
v′(y)
. (39)
More downside risk aversion can guarantee that the decision-maker with a utility function
that has more downside risk aversion is willing to pay more to avoid the downside risk increase
as defined by Menezes et al. (1980). We can therefore extend Proposition 3.4 as follows:
Proposition 4.3 Suppose u′, v′, u′′′ and v′′′ are continuous, then the following statements hold:
(i) put ≥ pvt for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ F2 if and only if v is more Ross and downside risk averse
than u;
(ii) put ≥ pvt for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ G2 if and only if u is more Ross and downside risk averse
than v;
We also obtain the following results for changes in joint distributions.
Proposition 4.4 (i) Suppose F (xt+1, ct+1) is continuous and E
F
t x˜t+1 = E
H
t x˜t+1, then p
F
t ≤ pHt
for all risk averse and prudent representative agents if and only if F (xt+1, ct+1) is more second-
degree expectation dependent than H(xt+1, ct+1);
(ii) Suppose F (Rt+1, ct+1) is continuous, then for all risk averse and prudent representative
agents, F (Rt+1, ct+1) is more second-degree expectation dependent than H(Rt+1, ct+1) if and
only if the risk premium under F (Rt+1, ct+1) is greater than under H(Rt+1, ct+1).
Corollary 4.5 For all risk averse and prudent representative agents, EFt x˜t+1 ≤ EHt x˜t+1 and
F (xt+1, ct+1) is more second-degree expectation dependent than H(xt+1, ct+1) implies p
F
t ≤ pHt ;
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4.2 C-CAPM for a higher-order representative agent
Ekern (1980) provides the following definition to sign the higher-order risk attitude.
Definition 4.6 (Ekern 1980) An agent u is N th degree risk averse, if and only if
(−1)Nu(N)(x) ≤ 0 for all x, (40)
where u(N)(·) denotes the N th derivative of u(x).
Ekern (1980) shows that all agents having utility function with N th degree risk aversion
dislike a probability change if and only if it produces an increase in N th degree risk. Risk
aversion in the traditional sense of a concave utility function is indicated by N = 2. When
N = 3, we obtain u′′′ ≥ 0, which means that marginal utility is convex, or implies prudence.
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) derive a class of lottery pairs to show that lottery preferences
are compatible with Ekern’s N th degree risk aversion.
Jindapon and Neilson (2007) generalize Ross’ risk aversion to higher-order risk aversion.
Definition 4.7 (Jindapon and Neilson 2007) u is more N th-degree Ross risk averse than v if
and only if there exists λ > 0 such that for all x, y
u(N)(x)
v(N)(x)
≥ λ ≥ u
′(y)
v′(y)
. (41)
Li (2009) and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010) provide context-free explanations for higher-
order Ross risk aversion. In Appendix B, we generalize the results of Section 3 and 4 to higher-
degree risks and higher order representative agents.
5 Pricing with two local absolute indexes of risk attitude
If we assume that c˜t and c˜t+1 are close enough, then we can use the local coefficient of risk
aversion and local downside risk aversion (see Modica and Scarsini, 2005) to obtain the following
approximation formulas for (28) and (35):
pt ≈ Etx˜t+1
Rf
+ β
u′′(ct)
u′(ct)
∫ +∞
−∞
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)Fct+1(ct+1)dct+1 (42)
=
Etx˜t+1
Rf
− βAR(ct)covt(x˜t+1, c˜t+1)
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and
pt ≈ Etx˜t+1
Rf
+ β
u′′(ct)
u′(ct)
covt(x˜t+1, c˜t+1)− βu
′′′(ct)
u′(ct)
∫ +∞
−∞
SED(x˜t+1|ct+1)dct+1 (43)
=
Etx˜t+1
Rf
− βAR(ct)covt(x˜t+1, c˜t+1)− βAP (ct)
∫ +∞
−∞
SED(x˜t+1|ct+1)dct+1.
When the variation of consumption is small, (42) implies that absolute risk aversion and covari-
ance determine asset prices while (43) implies that absolute risk aversion, absolute prudence,
covariance and SED determine asset prices. We mentioned before that SED(x˜|y) is related
to the 2nd central cross lower partial moment of x˜ and y˜, hence (43) provides a theoretical
explanation of the importance of higher-order risk preferences, higher-order moments and co-
moments in finance. Note that we obtain only approximations of asset prices when we use the
Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion and the extended measure of prudence as in Modica and
Scarsini (2005).
To analyze the equity premium puzzle, it is helpful to compute similar approximation for-
mulas for (29) and (37):
EtR˜t+1 −Rf ≈ −u
′′(ct)
u′(ct)
∫ +∞
−∞
FED(R˜t+1|ct+1)Fct+1(ct+1)dct+1 (44)
= AR(ct)covt(R˜t+1, c˜t+1)
and
EtR˜t+1 −Rf ≈ −u
′′(ct)
u′(ct)
covt(R˜t+1, c˜t+1) +
u′′′(ct)
u′(ct)
∫ +∞
−∞
SED(R˜t+1|ct+1)dct+1 (45)
= AR(ct)covt(R˜t+1, c˜t+1) +AP (ct)
∫ +∞
−∞
SED(R˜t+1|ct+1)dct+1.
For a given preference function and data on stock return and aggregate consumption, the
above approximations yield risk aversion estimates. These estimates allow one to gauge whether
the extended C-CAPM we propose improves the understanding of the equity premium puzzle.
6 Equity premium puzzle for a higher-order representative agent
6.1 Implications of our results on the equity premium puzzle
The major discrepancy between the C-CAPM model predictions and previous empirical reality
is identified as the equity premium puzzle in the literature. As mentioned in Section 3, the
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key empirical observations of the equity premium puzzle based on (25) can be summarized as
follows:
When the representative agent’s utility function is the power function, and c˜t+1 and x˜t+1
are conditional lognormally distributed, the observed equity premium can be explained only
by assuming a very high coefficient of relative risk aversion. It is also difficult to explain ob-
served high risk premia with the covariance because of the smoothness of consumption over
time. However, the equity premium puzzle conclusion is built on specific utility functions and
return distributions. Our theoretical results show that, for general utility functions and distri-
butions, covariance is not the key element of equity premium prediction. It is very easy to find
counterintuitive results. For example, given positively correlated gross return and consumption
distributions, a lower Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion may result in a higher
equity premium. Alternatively, given a representative agent’s preference, a lower covariance
between gross return and consumption may result in a higher equity premium. Therefore, (25)
is not a robust theoretical prediction of equity premia.
Our results prove that asset pricing’s comparative statics imply the following robust predic-
tions:
(a) expectation dependence between payoff and consumption determines asset riskiness
rather than covariance;
(b) when a representative agent’s risk preference satisfies higher-order risk aversion, more
expectation dependence between payoff and consumption is equivalent to a lower price.
(c) when a representative agent’s risk preference satisfies higher-order risk aversion, more
expectation dependence between gross return and consumption is equivalent to a higher equity
premium.
(d) when payoff and consumption are positive expectation dependent, higher risk aversion
in the sense of Ross is equivalent to a lower equity price.
We now test how our model can be useful to study the equity premium puzzle.
6.2 Consumption-based asset pricing with exponential utility
Does accounting for higher-order risk attitude and higher-order risk measure help mitigate the
equity premium puzzle? To answer this question, we assume that there is a representative agent
endowed with an exponential utility function defined over aggregate consumption ct. This is a
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significant departure from other classic papers on the equity premium puzzle, which consider
either the power utility preference (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Hansen and Singleton, 1983;
Campbell, 2003), or the Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991) and Weil (1989) recursive utility function
(Kandel and Stambaugh, 1991; Campbell, 2003). To be coherent with (44) and (45), we choose
the exponential utility function u (ct) = −e−λct , which entails a constant absolute risk aversion
coefficient λ in the sense of Arrow-Pratt, and a constant absolute prudence index λ2 in the sense
of Modica and Scarsini (2005).
Because the consumption level ct is known at time t, it follows from (44) that
EtR˜t+1 −Rf ≈ λcovt(R˜t+1,∆c˜t+1) (46)
where R˜t+1 is the asset’s net return, R
f is the net return of the risk-free asset8, and ∆c˜t+1 =
c˜t+1 − ct is the differenced consumption level.
Similarly, (45) is rewritten as
EtR˜t+1 −Rf ≈ λcovt(R˜t+1,∆c˜t+1) + λ2
∫ +∞
−∞
SED(R˜t+1|ct+1)dct+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
integrated consumption SED
. (47)
We compare the risk aversion estimates between (46) and (47) to assess the equity premium
puzzle improvement resulting from the inclusion of higher-order risk measures. To this end, we
compute both the covariance and the integrated second-degree expectation dependence between
the return and the differenced consumption series. Then, we solve for the absolute risk aversion
coefficient AR = λ. At a given time period t, the relative risk aversion is equal to the absolute risk
aversion multiplied by the current consumption. Thus, we compute an unconditional estimate
of the relative risk aversion RR as the absolute risk aversion AR times the average9 aggregate
consumption level c.
To calculate the integrated consumption second-degree expectation dependence, we proceed
as follows. Assume that the consumption level c˜ ∈ [c, c] takes n increasingly ordered values over
its support, where c = c(1) ≤ · · · ≤ c(i) ≤ · · · ≤ c(n) = c. Then, the integrated consumption
second-degree expectation dependence can be approximated as a sum of the products between
8Using gross returns
(
1 + R˜t+1
)
and
(
1 +Rf
)
rather than net returns amounts to a location shift in the
returns distribution, which changes neither the risk quantity nor the risk premium.
9Using the median rather than the average aggregate consumption gives similar relative risk aversion estimates.
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lower partial covariances and changes in increasingly ordered consumption levels:∫ c
c
SED
(
R˜t+1|ct+1
)
dct+1 ≈
n∑
i=2
SED
(
R˜t+1|c˜t+1 = c(i)
)
×
[
c(i) − c(i−1)
]
(48)
=
n∑
i=2
covt
(
R˜t+1, c˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ c(i)
)
×
[
c(i) − c(i−1)
]
=
n∑
i=2
covt
(
R˜t+1,∆c˜t+1|c˜t+1 ≤ c(i)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
lower partial covariance
×
[
c(i) − c(i−1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption change
.
For convenience, we summarize the estimation procedure of the absolute and relative risk
aversion coefficients with second-degree expectation dependence in 5 steps:
(step 1) sort the consumption level series in ascending order
{
c(i)
}n
i=1
, then find the corre-
sponding net returns R˜ and differenced consumption levels ∆c˜ observations;
(step 2) calculate n−1 consecutive lower partial covariances between the sorted series of net
returns R˜ and differenced consumption levels ∆c˜, starting with the observations corresponding
to the two lowest levels of consumption, and adding one new observation for each subsequent
covariance;
c(1) ≤ c(2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cov(R˜,∆c˜|c˜≤c(2))
≤ c(3)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
cov(R˜,∆c˜|c˜≤c(3))
≤ · · · ≤ c(n)
...︸ ︷︷ ︸
cov(R˜,∆c˜|c˜≤c(n))
;
(step 3) evaluate the integrated consumption SED in (48) as the sum of the products between
the n− 1 lower partial covariances and the changes in sorted consumption levels;
(step 4) solve the second-order equation (47) in λ to get an estimate of the absolute risk
aversion coefficient AR;
(step 5) compute an implied relative risk aversion proxy RR = AR× c.
The integrated consumption SED involves lower partial comovements between market port-
folio returns and consumption, and can be interpreted as a measure of downside consumption
risk (Hogan and Warren, 1974; Bawa and Lindenberg, 1977; Price, Price and Nantell, 1982).
For instance, a positive integrated consumption SED is obtained when there are “more” posi-
tive lower partial covariances between the returns and the consumption. That is, when stock
market portfolio returns are “more” positively correlated with consumption in the left part of
the consumption distribution. In that case, the stock market portfolio does not offer a hedge
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against the downside consumption risk. Thus, the representative investor requires a premium
as a compensation for bearing this risk.
The next subsection presents international evidence for the risk premium puzzle. Our results
advocate for higher-order expectation dependence measures in the consumption-based capital
asset pricing model.
6.3 Empirical results
For our empirical analysis, we use the same dataset as in Campbell (2003). The data can be
downloaded from Campbell’s website. This international developed-country dataset combines
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) stock market data with macroeconomic data on
consumption, interest rates, and the price index from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
of the International Monetary Fund. The data allow us to construct quarterly series of stock
market return, risk-free rate and per capita consumption spanning the early 1970s through the
late 1990s for 11 countries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. Longer annual series are also available for Sweden (1920-
1998), the UK (1919-1998) and the U.S. (1891-1998). We refer the reader to Campbell’s (2003)
chapter, for a full data description.
We begin by replicating the risk premium puzzle results in Campbell (2003). We use these
relative risk aversion estimates as benchmark values for the C-CAPM extension we propose in
this paper. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for international stock market returns
and consumption. Specifically, Table 1 shows the mean, standard deviation, and first-order
serial correlation for the real returns on the stock market index, the risk-free asset and the per
capita real consumption growth. While the top panel reports the results for quarterly data from
all 11 countries, the bottom panel presents longer annual sample data results for Sweden, UK
and USA only. At least six major empirical regularities emerge from Table 1:
(i) stock market real returns have been historically high, averaging above 4.5% in most
countries except Australia and Italy;
(ii) by contrast, real risk-free rates have been low, generally under 3% except for Germany
and the Netherlands;
(ii) stock market annualized volatility is found between 15% and 27%, while the returns are
weakly autocorrelated;
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(iv) risk-free rates have shown low annualized volatility, never exceeding 3% for quarterly
data and 9% for annual data;
(vi) consumption growth has been smooth for all countries, with annualized standard devi-
ation barely reaching 3%;
(vii) the correlation and, thus, the covariance between stock market real returns and con-
sumption growth has been weak for most countries, even negative for France, Italy and Switzer-
land.
Table 1: International stock, Tbill log returns and per capita consumption growth
Country Sample period re σ (re) ρ (re) rf σ (rf ) ρ (rf ) ∆ log c σ (∆ log c) ρ (∆ log c) ρ (re,∆ log c)
USA 1947.2-1998.4 8.085 15.645 0.083 0.891 1.746 0.507 1.964 1.073 0.216 0.231
AUL 1970.1-1999.1 3.540 22.700 0.005 2.054 2.528 0.645 2.099 2.056 -0.324 0.158
CAN 1970.1-1999.2 5.431 17.279 0.072 2.713 1.856 0.667 2.082 1.971 0.105 0.183
FR 1973.2-1998.4 9.023 23.425 0.048 2.715 1.837 0.710 1.233 2.909 0.029 -0.099
GER 1978.4-1997.4 9.838 20.097 0.090 3.219 1.152 0.348 1.681 2.431 -0.327 0.027
ITA 1971.2-1998.2 3.168 27.039 0.079 2.371 2.847 0.691 2.200 1.700 0.283 -0.028
JAP 1970.2-1999.1 4.715 21.909 0.021 1.388 2.298 0.480 3.205 2.554 -0.275 0.112
NTH 1977.4-1998.4 14.407 17.384 -0.037 3.523 1.535 -0.173 1.763 2.488 -0.215 0.030
SWD 1970.1-1999.3 10.648 23.840 0.022 1.995 2.835 0.260 0.962 1.856 -0.266 0.016
SWT 1982.2-1999.1 13.745 21.828 -0.128 1.393 1.498 0.243 0.524 2.112 -0.399 -0.119
UK 1970.1-1999.2 8.156 21.190 0.084 1.301 2.957 0.478 2.203 2.507 -0.006 0.123
USA 1970.1-1998.4 6.929 17.556 0.051 1.485 1.685 0.571 1.812 0.907 0.374 0.289
SWD 1920-1998 6.561 18.262 0.069 2.167 6.189 0.667 1.727 2.831 0.169 0.213
UK 1919-1998 7.398 22.098 -0.024 1.227 5.800 0.588 1.466 2.827 0.284 0.413
USA 1891-1998 6.670 18.372 0.024 1.970 8.779 0.402 1.769 3.211 -0.117 0.449
Clearly, high stock market returns with low risk-free rates and weak covariance between stock
returns and consumption growth, yield high relative risk aversion coefficients for an aggregate
investor who maximizes a time-additive power utility function. This finding provides insight
into the equity premium puzzle presented in Table 2. For each country, Table 2 reports the
quantities required to compute the relative risk aversion in equation (25). The first column
shows the annualized percentage average excess log return inflated by one-half of the variance of
the excess log return as an adjustment for Jensen’s Inequality. Because we use quarterly series
to compute the top panel results, we multiply the values by 400. To express the bottom panel
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results in annualized percentage points, we multiply the values by 100 given that they come from
annual series. The second and third columns report the standard deviation of the market excess
log return and the consumption growth. To annualize the standard deviations, we multiply the
quarterly numbers by 200. Correlations and covariances between the excess log return and the
consumption growth are presented in the fourth and fifth columns. The two last columns give
relative risk aversion estimates based on sample correlations (RR (1)) and assuming a maximum
correlation of one (RR (2)). The latter counterfactual assumption induces lower levels of relative
risk aversion.
Table 2: The equity premium puzzle with covariance as per equation (25)
Country Sample period aere σ (ere) σ (∆ log c) ρ (ere,∆ log c) cov (ere,∆ log c) Campbell 2003
RR (1) RR (2)
USA 1947.2-1998.3 8.074 15.272 1.072 0.205 3.358 240.442 49.293
AUL 1970.1-1998.4 3.885 22.403 2.060 0.144 6.629 58.609 8.435
CAN 1970.1-1999.1 3.968 17.266 1.920 0.202 6.871 57.743 11.659
FR 1973.2-1998.3 8.308 23.175 2.922 -0.093 -6.288 < 0 12.322
GER 1978.4-1997.3 8.669 20.196 2.447 0.029 1.437 603.375 17.657
ITA 1971.2-1998.1 4.687 27.068 1.665 -0.006 -0.258 < 0 10.186
JAP 1970.2-1998.4 5.098 21.498 2.561 0.112 6.154 82.842 9.285
NTH 1977.4-1998.3 11.628 17.082 2.486 0.039 1.643 707.834 27.357
SWD 1970.1-1999.2 11.540 23.518 1.851 0.015 0.675 1708.667 26.431
SWT 1982.2-1998.4 14.898 21.878 2.123 -0.112 -5.154 < 0 32.243
UK 1970.1-1999.1 9.169 21.198 2.512 0.093 4.921 186.329 17.255
USA 1970.1-1998.3 6.359 16.979 0.909 0.274 4.224 150.531 41.308
SWD 1920-1997 5.879 18.192 2.826 0.165 8.523 68.973 11.413
UK 1919-1997 8.301 20.644 2.752 0.338 19.747 42.035 14.223
USA 1891-1997 6.329 17.968 3.211 0.490 28.283 22.377 10.971
aere = re − rf + var (ere) /2 and cov (ere,∆ log c) is in %2.
Consistent with Campbell (2003), our estimations yield implausible relative risk aversion
coefficients RR (1). These coefficients are negative for France, Italy and Switzerland while
ranging from 57.7 to 1708.7 for the other countries. Even though the risk aversion numbers
from annual series seem lower than the positive ones from quarterly data, they all exceed 22.
This stylized fact illustrates the equity premium puzzle in the basic C-CAPM.
We now present the empirical evidence on the equity premium puzzle with expectation depen-
dence as per equations (46) and (47). In our extended C-CAPM framework, the representative
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investor is equipped with an exponential utility function instead of a power utility preference
as in the basic C-CAPM studied in Campbell (2003). Moreover, we employ “net” real excess
returns and “differenced” real per capita consumption rather than “log” excess returns and real
per capita consumption “growth”. Table 3 presents the means, standard deviations and first-
order autocorrelations for the stock market index net return, the net return on the risk-free asset
and the differenced consumption. The average net return values in Table 3 are slightly higher
than the average log returns in Table 1 due to Jensen’s Inequality. Note that the stylized facts
(i)-(iv) broadly hold for net returns series as well.
Table 3: International stock, Tbill net returns and differenced per capita consumption
Country Sample period Re σ (Re) ρ (Re) Rf σ (Rf ) ρ (Rf ) ∆c σ (∆c) ρ (∆c)
USA 1947.2-1998.4 9.381 15.476 0.092 0.907 1.744 0.508 201.976 106.067 0.327
AUL 1970.1-1999.1 6.005 21.401 0.004 2.091 2.528 0.647 262.104 237.865 -0.233
CAN 1970.1-1999.2 6.931 16.940 0.070 2.739 1.863 0.667 264.206 234.242 0.092
FR 1973.2-1998.4 11.836 23.263 0.054 2.741 1.847 0.710 710.758 1856.763 0.025
GER 1978.4-1997.4 11.899 19.195 0.124 3.238 1.160 0.347 338.385 477.527 -0.310
ITA 1971.2-1998.2 6.893 28.210 0.071 2.418 2.843 0.693 261.735 185.779 0.347
JAP 1970.2-1999.1 7.105 21.668 0.031 1.417 2.287 0.478 48.238×103 41.908×103 -0.380
NTH 1977.4-1998.4 16.163 17.183 -0.023 3.551 1.547 -0.173 352.418 479.193 -0.194
SWD 1970.1-1999.3 13.642 24.150 0.060 2.040 2.841 0.260 610.491 1068.867 -0.227
SWT 1982.2-1999.1 16.293 21.135 -0.133 1.406 1.499 0.243 145.099 552.346 -0.398
UK 1970.1-1999.2 10.534 22.259 0.036 1.346 2.932 0.481 121.591 124.522 0.061
USA 1970.1-1998.4 8.506 17.278 0.061 1.502 1.694 0.570 230.745 114.609 0.353
SWD 1920-1998 8.519 19.399 0.057 2.391 6.665 0.667 786.308 1184.255 0.136
UK 1919-1998 10.196 23.620 -0.074 1.405 6.011 0.585 56.743 100.789 0.437
USA 1891-1998 8.622 18.843 0.003 2.382 9.110 0.400 99.139 132.508 0.222
Re and Rf are net returns in %. ∆c is the differenced consumption also in %.
Furthermore, the differenced consumption series ∆c exhibits patterns that are similar to the
consumption growth series ∆ log c:
(vii) first-order autocorrelations are weak, while as shown in Figure 1, the coefficients of
variation10 for these two series are almost identical and do not exceed 2 except for France and
Switzerland.
10The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.
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Figure 1: Coefficients of variation for consumption growth and differenced consumption series
It is noteworthy to mention that the extended C-CAPM we propose can easily accommodate
higher-order risk attitudes without any particular restriction on the choice of the utility function
or the joint distribution of the return and consumption. Table 4 turns to equations (46) and
(47) to estimate the coefficient of relative risk aversion in the C-CAPM under expectation
dependence. The two first columns in Table 4 report the annualized average excess returns
and per capita consumption levels expressed in percentage points. The third column gives the
covariance between the net return and the differenced consumption. The fourth column gives
the integrated second-degree expectation dependence between the net return and the differenced
consumption, which is computed according to (48). For nearly all countries, the covariance and
the integrated SED have the same sign. As argued in Campbell (2003), the negative covariance
and integrated SED for France and Switzerland may arise from short-term measurement errors in
consumption. Interestingly, for Italy, the covariance between the net return and the differenced
consumption is negative, whereas the integrated SED appears positive. By focusing only on the
covariance, one might fail to capture the downside risk and thus, miss an important part of the
equity premium. We now discuss the empirical evidence supporting this argument.
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The right part of Table 4 presents two groups of four columns each. The first group headed
FED uses (46) to compute the implied absolute risk aversion, dividing the average excess return
by the covariance between the net return and the differenced consumption. In this group, the
column headed AR (1) reports the absolute risk aversion. The column headed AR (2) sets the
correlation to a maximum value of one before computing the absolute risk aversion. The next
two columns headed RR (1) and RR (2) report relative risk aversion estimates, resulting from
the product between corresponding absolute risk aversion coefficients and average consumption
levels. The implied relative risk aversion coefficients estimated from the first-degree expectation
dependence C-CAPM (46) are similar to the ones from the basic C-CAPM presented in Table
2. The equity premium puzzle seems robust across all 11 countries with huge relative risk
aversion numbers. Even when we consider a maximum correlation of one between return and
consumption, estimated relative risk aversion coefficients are still big for the U.S., Germany, the
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. The results are similar to those presented in Table 2,
which supports our methodology.
The second column group headed “FED with SED” gives the absolute risk aversion coeffi-
cients by solving the second-order equation (47). The absolute risk aversion coefficient is the
only unknown in (47), because the estimated average excess return, covariance and integrated
SED are readily available. The second group of four columns has the same structure as the
previous one. The columns headed AR (1) and AR (2) show implied absolute risk aversion coef-
ficients based on empirical correlation or assuming a maximum correlation of one. These implied
absolute risk aversion values are then multiplied by average consumption levels to calculate the
corresponding relative risk aversion coefficients RR (1) and RR (2). In contrast with the re-
sults from the FED C-CAPM (46), the relative risk aversion coefficients estimated from the
FED-SED C-CAPM (47) appear much closer to plausible numbers. The relative risk aversion
coefficients are still negative for France and Switzerland, but now range from 7.9 to 95.1 for
the other countries. Clearly, we notice a sharp reduction in the relative risk aversion estimates
when the C-CAPM includes the consumption second-degree expectation dependence effect. The
FED-SED implied relative risk aversion coefficients are 63, 32, 24, 14, 12, 11 times smaller than
their FED implied counterparts for Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, USA, UK, and Japan.
Further, the relative risk aversion estimate shifts from a negative value to become positive (18.5)
for Italy. The RR (2) values vary from 2.6 to 15.3 in the last column, which correspond to the
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theoretical values often proposed in the literature.
In a nutshell, accounting for the integrated SED improves the C-CAPM estimation dra-
matically and delivers reasonable risk aversion coefficients. Our empirical findings illustrate the
need to include higher-order risk attitudes associated with higher-degree expectation dependence
measures in the C-CAPM analysis. Beyond its theoretical appeal, the concept of expectation
dependence helps bridge the gap between real-world data and the consumption-based capital
asset pricing model.
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7 Concluding remarks
We have proposed a new theoretical framework for solving the equity premium puzzle. Our
contribution emphasizes the importance of measuring the dependence between agregate con-
sumption and asset returns adequately. We use the concept of expectation dependence and
show that taking into account higher degrees of risk dependence and orders of risk behavior
than covariance and risk aversion is the key to understanding the variations in asset returns and
the corresponding equity premia. Our empirical results confirm that using more general mea-
sures of risk dependence and risk behavior reduce the implicit measures of relative risk aversion
and partly solve the equity premium puzzle.
Because the comparative Ross risk aversion is fairly restrictive upon preference, some readers
may regard the comparative risk aversion results as a negative result, because no standard utility
functions satisfy such condition on the whole domain. However, some utility functions satisfy
comparative Ross risk aversion in some domain. For example, Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008)
and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010) assert that (−1)N+1 u(N)u′ is an appropriate local index of
N th order risk attitude. Nonetheless, some readers may think that because no standard utility
functions satisfy these conditions, experimental methods to identify these conditions may need
to be developed. Ross (1981), Modica and Scarsini (2005), Li (2009) and Denuit and Eeckhoudt
(2010) provide context-free experiments for comparative Ross risk aversion. Denuit et al (2011)
found a relationship between Ross risk aversion and one-switch utility function. More recently,
Dionne and Li (2012) verified that decreasing cross risk aversion gives rise to the utility function
family belonging to the class of n-switch utility functions. More research is needed in both
directions to develop the theoretical foundations for C-CAPM. This paper takes a first step
in that direction. We have proposed a new unified interpretation to C-CAPM, which we have
related to the equity premium puzzle problem. Our results are important because C-CAPM
shares the positive versus normative tensions that prevail in finance and economics to explain
asset prices and equity premia.
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8 Appendix A: Proofs of propositions
8.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
(i): The sufficient conditions are directly obtained from (28) and (29). We prove the necessity
using a contradiction. Suppose that FED(x˜t+1|ct+1) < 0 for c0t+1. Because of the continuity of
FED(x˜|y), we have FED(x˜t+1|c0t+1) < 0 in interval [a,b]. Choose the following utility function:
u¯(x) =

αx− e−a x < a
αx− e−x a ≤ x ≤ b
αx− e−b x > b,
(49)
where α > 0. Then
u¯′(x) =

α x < a
α+ e−x a ≤ x ≤ b
α x > b
(50)
and
u¯′′(x) =

0 x < a
−e−x a ≤ x ≤ b
0 x > b.
(51)
Therefore,
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf
− β 1
u′(ct)
∫ b
a
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)e−ct+1dct+1 >
Etx˜t+1
Rf
. (52)
This is a contradiction.
(ii) (iii) and (iv): We can prove them using the same approach used in (i).
8.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4
(i): The sufficient conditions are directly obtained from (28), and (32). We prove the necessity
by a contradiction. Suppose that there exists some ct+1 and ct such that
u′′(ct+1)
v′′(ct+1) >
u′(ct)
v′(ct) .
Because u′, v′, u′′ and v′′ are continuous, there exists a neighborhood [γ1, γ2], such that
u′′(ct+1)
v′′(ct+1)
>
u′(ct)
v′(ct)
for all (ct+1, ct) ∈ [γ1, γ2], (53)
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hence
−u′′(ct+1)
−v′′(ct+1) >
u′(ct)
v′(ct)
for all (ct+1, ct) ∈ [γ1, γ2], (54)
and
−u
′′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
> −v
′′(ct+1)
v′(ct)
for all (ct+1, ct) ∈ [γ1, γ2]. (55)
If F (x, y) is a distribution function such that FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)FY (y) is strictly positive on interval
[γ1, γ2] and is equal to zero on other intervals, then we have
put − pvt = β
∫ γ2
γ1
FED(x˜t+1|ct+1)FY (y)[u
′′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
− v
′′(ct+1)
v′(ct)
] < 0. (56)
This is a contradiction.
(ii): We can prove them using the same approach used in (i).
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3.6
(i) The sufficient conditions are directly obtained from (28), and (33). We prove the necessity us-
ing a contradiction. Suppose FEDF (x˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1) < FEDH(x˜t+1|ct+1)HCt+1(ct+1) for
c0t+1. Owing to the continuity of FEDF (x˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)− FEDH(x˜t+1|ct+1)HCt+1(ct+1),
we have FEDF (x˜t+1|c0t+1)FCt+1(c0t+1) < FEDH(x˜t+1|c0t+1)HCt+1(c0t+1) in interval [a,b]. Choose
the following utility function:
u¯(x) =

αx− e−a x < a
αx− e−x a ≤ x ≤ b
αx− e−b x > b,
(57)
where α > 0. Then
u¯′(x) =

α x < a
α+ e−x a ≤ x ≤ b
α x > b
(58)
and
u¯′′(x) =

0 x < a
−e−x a ≤ x ≤ b
0 x > b.
(59)
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Therefore,
pFt − pHt (60)
= β
1
u′(ct)
∫ b
a
[FEDH(x˜t+1|ct+1)FCt+1(ct+1)− FEDF (x˜t+1|y)FCt+1(ct+1)]e−ct+1dct+1 > 0.
(ii): We can prove them using the same approach used in (i).
9 Appendix B: Higher-order risks and higher order representa-
tive agents
In this section, we suppose x˜ × y˜ ∈ [a, b] × [d, e], where a, b, d and e are finite. Rewriting
1thED(x˜|y) = FED(x˜|y), 2thED(x˜|y) = SED(x˜|y) = ∫ yd FED(x˜|t)FY (t)dt, repeated integrals
yield:
N thED(x˜|y) =
∫ y
d
(N − 1)thED(x˜|t)dt, for N ≥ 3. (61)
Definition 9.1 (Li 2011) If kthED(x˜|e) ≥ 0, for k = 2, ..., N − 1 and
N thED(x˜|y) ≥ 0 for all y ∈ [d, e], (62)
then x˜ is positive N th-order expectation dependent on y˜ (N thED(x˜|y)).
The family of all distributions F satisfying (62) will be denoted by FN . Similarly, x˜ is
negative N th-order expectation dependent on y˜ if (62) holds with the inequality sign reversed,
and the totality of negative N th-order expectation dependent distributions will be denoted by
GN . From this definition, we know that FN−1 ⊆ FN and GN−1 ⊆ GN but the converse is
not true. N th-order expectation dependence is related to N th-order central cross lower partial
moment of x˜ and y˜ (See, Li (2011) for more details). Several recent studies in finance have
focused on estimators of higher-order moments and comoments of the return distribution (i.e.
coskewness and cokurtosis) and showed that these estimates generate a better explanation of
investors’ portfolios (see, Martellini and Ziemann (2010) for more details).
Definition 9.2 Define ithEDF and i
thEDH , for i = 1, .., N , as the i
th expectation dependence
under distribution F (x, y) and H(x, y) respectively. Distribution F (x, y) is more first-degree
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expectation dependent than H(x, y), if and only if FEDF (x˜|y)FY (y) ≥ FEDH(x˜|y)HY (y) for
all y ∈ [d, e]. Distribution F (x, y) is more N th-order expectation dependent than H(x, y) for
N ≥ 2, if kthEDF (x˜|e) ≥ kthEDH(x˜|e), for k = 2, ..., N − 1 and
N thEDF (x˜|y) ≥ N thEDH(x˜|y) for all y ∈ [d, e]. (63)
Suppose (x˜t+1, R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ [x, x]× [R,R]× [c, c]. We integrate the right-hand term of (27)
by parts repeatedly until we obtain:
cov[u′(c˜t+1), x˜t+1] =
N∑
k=2
(−1)ku(k)(c)kthED(x˜t+1|c) (64)
+
∫ c
c
(−1)N+1u(N+1)(ct+1)N thED(x˜t+1|ct+1)dct+1, for n ≥ 2.
Then (23) and (24) can be rewritten as:
pt =
Etx˜t+1
Rf︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted present value effect
−β
N∑
k=2
kthED(x˜t+1|c)[(−1)k+1u
(k)(c)
u′(ct)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
higher−order cross moments effect
(65)
−β
∫ c
c
N thED(x˜t+1|ct+1)[(−1)N+2u
(N+1)(ct+1)
u′(ct)
]dct+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nth−order expectation dependence effect
=
Etx˜t+1
Rf
− β
N∑
k=2
kthED(x˜t+1|c)AR(k)(c)MRSc,ct
−β
∫ c
c
N thED(x˜t+1|ct+1)AR(k+1)(ct+1)MRSct+1,ctdct+1
where AR(k)(x) = (−1)k+1 u(k)(x)u′(x) is the absolute index of kth order risk aversion, and
EtR˜t+1 −Rf (66)
=
N∑
k=2
kthED(R˜t+1|c)[(−1)k+1 u
(k)(c)
Etu′(c˜t+1)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
consumption cross moments effect
+
∫ c
c
N thED(R˜t+1|ct+1)[(−1)N+2u
(N+1)(ct+1)
Etu′(c˜t+1)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Nth degree expectation dependence effect
dct+1
= βRf
N∑
k=2
kthED(R˜t+1|c)AR(k)(c)MRSc,ct
+βRf
∫ c
c
N thED(R˜t+1|ct+1)AR(k+1)(ct+1)MRSct+1,ctdct+1.
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Condition (65) includes three terms. The first one is the same as in condition (28). The second
term on the right-hand side of (65) is called the “higher-order cross moments effect.” This term
involves β, the intensity of higher-order risk aversion, the marginal rates of substitution and the
higher-order cross moments of asset return and consumption. The third term on the right-hand
side of (65) is called “N th − degree expectation dependence effect,” which reflects the way in
which N th-degree expectation dependence of risks affects asset price through the intensity of
absolute N th risk aversion and the marginal rates of substitution.
We state the following propositions without proof (The proofs of these propositions are
similar to the proofs of propositions in Section 3, and are therefore skipped. They are however
available from the authors.).
Proposition 9.3 Suppose F (xt+1, ct+1) and F (Rt+1, ct+1) are continuous, then the following
statements hold:
(i) pt ≤ Etx˜t+1Rf for any ith risk averse representative agent with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and only
if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ FN ;
(ii) pt ≥ Etx˜t+1Rf for any ith risk averse representative agent with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and only
if (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ GN ;
(iii) EtR˜t+1 ≥ Rf for any ith risk averse representative agents with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and
only if (R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ FN ;
(iv) EtR˜t+1 ≤ Rf for any ith risk averse representative agents with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and
only if (R˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ GN .
Proposition 9.3 suggests that, for an ith-degree risk averse representative agent with i =
1, .., n = 1, an asset’s price is lowered if and only if its payoff N th-order is positively expectation
dependent on consumption. Conversely, an asset’s price is raised if and only if it N th-order
is negatively expectation dependent on consumption. Therefore, for ith-degree representative
agents with i = 1, .., N + 1, it is the N th-order expectation dependence that determines its
riskiness. The next two propositions and Corollary 9.6 have a similar general intuition when
compared with those in Section 3.
Proposition 9.4 Suppose u′, v′, uN+1 and vN+1 are continuous, then the following statements
hold:
(i) put ≥ pvt for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ FN if and only if v is more ith risk averse than u for
i = 2, ..., N + 1;
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(ii) put ≥ pvt for all (x˜t+1, c˜t+1) ∈ GN if and only if u is more ith risk averse than v for
i = 2, ..., N + 1;
Proposition 9.5 (i) Suppose F (xt+1, ct+1) is continuous and E
F
t x˜t+1 = E
H
t x˜t+1, then p
F
t ≤ pHt
for all ith risk averse representative agents with i = 2, ..., N + 1 if and only if F (xt+1, ct+1) is
N th more expectation dependent than H(xt+1, ct+1);
(ii) Suppose F (Rt+1, ct+1) is continuous, then for all i
th risk averse representative agents
with i = 2, ..., N + 1,, F (Rt+1, ct+1) is more i
th-degree expectation dependent than H(Rt+1, ct+1)
if and only if the risk premium under F (Rt+1, ct+1) is greater than H(Rt+1, ct+1).
Corollary 9.6 For all ith risk averse representative agents with i = 2, ..., N + 1, EFt x˜t+1 ≤
EHt x˜t+1 and F (xt+1, ct+1) is more N
th-degree expectation dependent than H(xt+1, ct+1) implies
pFt ≤ pHt ;
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